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Abstract 
Electroencephalography (EEG) studies indicate a reduced or absent self-preference 
effect for faces in individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The 
current study extends these findings to individuals below the diagnostic cut-off for ASD 
who differ in social engagement and extends the modality to auditory stimuli. 
Participants (n=908) were classified as either high or low in social engagement, but 
within the sub-clinical range, using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and the Broad 
Autism Phenotype Questionnaire, then during dense array EEG a subset of participants 
(n=21) were presented with images of faces or names, read auditorily, in three 
categories: themselves (24 trials), a close “other” (24 trials), and a stranger (72 trials).   
A marginally significant interaction between peak and social engagement was observed 
on amplitude when viewing faces.  There was a significant effect of condition on P300 
for component 1; higher amplitudes were recorded in response to viewing images of the 
close other.  A significant interaction between condition and social engagement was 
observed for latency.  A main effect of condition on amplitude was noted when hearing 
names.  Additionally, a main effect of condition on latency for names was observed.  
For P300 latency in response to names, a main effect of condition was observed, 
suggesting the self-preference effect occurs in response to auditory stimuli. 
 
Keywords: Autism, EEG, social engagement, communication, self-preference effect, 
AQ, BAPQ
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
ASD has a prevalence of 1 in 68 individuals in the US, making it one of the 
most common neurodevelopmental disorders.  Its commonly reported symptoms 
include social and communicative impairment, repetitive behavior, and restricted 
interests (APA, 2013).  A wealth of research has focused on the social symptoms, but 
the need still exists to understand social/cognitive deficits as related to the self. While 
many studies have reported deficits in processing familiar vs unfamiliar faces in ASD 
(Cygan, Tacikowski, Ostaszewski, Chojnicka, & Nowicka, 2014), few have focused on 
the neural correlates of recognizing and processing the self beyond a simple 
differentiation based on familiarity, despite the wealth of behavioral literature on theory 
of mind deficits in ASD (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Happé, 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).  
Recent literature has shed light on a different neural pattern that emerges for those with 
autism in response to the self as opposed to when viewing a close other such as a friend 
or loved one (Cygan, Tacikowski, Ostaszewski, Chojnicka, & Nowicka, 2014).  This 
study provided evidence for a reduced or absent self-preference effect for individuals 
with ASD.  Through analysis of P100, N170, and P300, data indicated that for the 
control group, the self-preference effect was clearly demonstrated: higher P300 
amplitude was observed in response to presentation of the own face and own name on a 
computer screen.  However, for the ASD group, presentation of both the own face and 
close other was associated with enhanced P300.  These findings illustrated that for 
individuals with ASD, similar attention was allocated for any familiar face or name, 
rather than for the self only as in the typically developed group.  It is important to 
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understand this impairment in differentiating the self and close others; honing in on how 
individuals and relationships are processed is imperative in creating the best and most 
viable treatment options for individuals with ASD.  Through exploration of this issue 
and application of the knowledge gained, therapists, doctors, and practitioners can begin 
to attempt to address the restrictive social deficits that alienate individuals with ASD 
from many aspects of society. 
Although few studies concerning visual perception of the self have been 
conducted, many auditory studies have been completed.  One fMRI study focused on 
the brain areas activated when an individual hears one’s own name in non-autistic 
participants (Carmody & Lewis, 2006).  Findings indicated greater left hemisphere 
activation in response to hearing one’s own name in the middle frontal cortex, superior 
temporal cortex, and cuneus.  Another fMRI study investigated responses to viewing 
images of faces of the self and others by typically developed children and children with 
autism (Uddin et al., 2008).  In this study, the images shown were digitally morphed 
versions of the individual’s own face combined with different percentages of another 
face of the same gender.  Children with ASD only activated the prefrontal/premotor 
system when viewing images that were mostly the own face, as opposed to typically 
developed children, who recruited this system when viewing all faces. 
While few studies highlight self-perception in children with autism, basic 
sensory studies of children with autism using both EEG and magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) generally show atypical ERP response at early latencies.  These were observed 
in P100, N100, P200, and P300 when children were exposed to a simple tone or flash of 
light (Martineau, Garreau, Barthelemy, & Lelord, 1984).  This indicates impairment in 
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visual sensory processing, which is key to adequately responding to the social 
environment and self-referential stimuli.  N1c, used to measure auditory temporal 
responses, was found to show smaller amplitude and longer latency in children with 
autism than controls (Bruneau, Bonnet-Brilhault, Gomot, Adrien, & Barthélémy, 2003).  
This further implies that children with autism have more trouble processing auditory 
stimuli.  Another auditory study compared linguistic impairment between children with 
autism and those with specific language impairment.  This MEG study showed the right 
hemisphere M50 latency as a useful indicator of this impairment in both types of 
children with language impairment, physiologically providing evidence that children 
with autism have basic sensory deficits associated with difficulty in understanding 
language, a crucial component of the social world (Cardy, Flagg, Roberts, & Roberts, 
2008).   
Autism is a spectrum of disorders, with some manifestations having more 
symptoms that affect daily life than others.  Social function in society exists along a 
continuum, with clinically relevant features of autism populating the more extreme low 
end of that spectrum.  Because variability in social function may be continuous, without 
a clear demarcation at the diagnostic threshold, it is important to study self-preference 
in people on both the high and low end of the complete spectrum.  In order to do this, it 
is also important to understand how people who do not meet diagnostic criteria for ASD 
but exhibit variable social preferences function in the social and individual world.  In 
this study, people who do not meet diagnostic criteria for ASD were placed into both 
high- and low-social groups, allowing for investigation of neural activity correlated with 
the process of perceiving the self and others as it relates to a continuum. 
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The ERP Method 
The event related potentials (ERP) method was selected for this experiment due 
to its ability to highlight neural mechanisms underlying sensory and cognitive 
processing that may not always be apparent when studying overt behavior.  Using this 
method has allowed researchers to look at sources of the core symptomatic deficits in 
autism by allowing focus on fundamental processing impairments and linking these to 
those social deficits that typically define the disorder (Jeste & Nelson, 2009).  ERPs 
show changes in electrical activity across the scalp surface in response to an event or 
stimulus as part of the ongoing EEG recording.  The components studied are labeled 
based on certain signal characteristics.  Each is labeled with a “P” or “N,” representing 
positive or negative voltage in the area of peak activity, and a number representing 
either the latency or the order in the train of components.  For example, P300 or P3 is a 
positive component that occurs about 300 ms after stimulus onset and is the third major 
positive component.  The early components reflect basic-level sensory processing, 
while the later components reflect cognitive and perceptual stimulus processing. 
For auditory stimuli, N100 occurs between 80 ms and 120 ms after stimulus 
presentation and is thought to be generated in the primary auditory cortex with 
additional activation in occipito-parietal cortex, occipito-temporal cortex, frontal cortex, 
association auditory cortex, planum temporale, superior temporal gyrus, and Heschl’s 
gyrus (Zouridakis, Simos, & Papanicolaou, 1998; Clark, Fan, & Hillyard, 1994; Godey, 
Schwartz, de Graaf, Chauvel, & Liégeois-Chauvel, 2001; Näätänen & Picton, 1987).  
P100 is a very reliable peak that appears as a large positive wave, occurring at about 
100 ms after stimulus onset.  It is known to originate in the extrastriate cortex for visual 
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stimuli and is modulated by attention (Mangun et al., 1993).  For auditory stimuli, the 
signal originates in the auditory cortex; it is collected at electrodes over fronto-medial 
sensors due to the orientation of the auditory cortex.  N170 is the earliest, most 
prominent, widely-studied visual ERP component that elicits a larger negative-going 
ERP in response to faces rather than objects (Eimer, 2010).  It occurs between 130 ms 
and 200 ms post-stimulus (Rossion & Jacques, 2008).  The source for N170 is at the 
inferior-temporal gyri and fusiform face area, and it is collected at electrodes in the 
occipito-temporal region.  Evidence indicates that P200, peaking between 175 ms and 
200 ms, may reflect neural processing when a sensory input is compared with 
memories, expectations, or internal representations (Evans & Federmeier, 2007).  
Known sources include the secondary auditory and visual cortex (Ross & Tremblay, 
2009; Omoto et al., 2010).  It is collected at electrodes in the centro-frontal and parieto-
occipital regions for auditory and visual stimuli, respectively.  P300 is elicited when 
cortical processing of a task-related event occurs; it is attention-dependent and therefore 
reflects higher-level cognitive processing of a stimulus (Jeste & Nelson, 2009).  This 
component, occurring between 250 and 500 ms after stimulus presentation, generates 
during the processing of stimulus information in context of task (Polich, 2007).  P300 
sources include the inferior parietal lobe, temporo-parietal junction, superior temporal 
gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and the 
supplementary motor cortex; it is collected at electrodes over the parietal region (Mulert 
et al., 2004).  Each of these components has been implicated in visual and auditory 
processing deficits in ASD (REFs), but less is known about how these components vary 
systematically with ASD-like features in the general population. In order to adequately 
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capture and understand social processing variability as it relates to the autism spectrum 
continuum, it is necessary to investigate activity at these key component locations.   
In this study, we aim to identify the peak latencies and amplitudes at each component of 
interest for individuals both high and low in social engagement, collected while viewing 
images or hearing the names of the self, close other, and strangers.  We hypothesize 
that, following the patterns in previous research, individuals high in social engagement 
will exhibit higher amplitudes at task-relevant processing peaks in response to the self 
than will those low in social engagement.  The hypothesized peak differences are 
expected to occur at N170, P2, and P3. 
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Chapter 2: Method 
Participants 
Twenty-one adults (see Table 1 for demographics by group) completed the EEG 
portion of the study at the University of Oklahoma.  Each was prescreened using the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001) and the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley, Losh, 
Parlier, Reznick, & Piven, 2007).  Participants with a score below 1.90 on the BAPQ 
aloof subscale and below 2 on the AQ social skills subscore were selected as individuals 
high in social engagement.  Participants with a score above 3.25 on the BAPQ aloof 
subscale and 4 or more on the AQ social skills subscore were selected as low in social 
engagement.  This range was decided using the parameters for typical and atypical 
individuals based upon the published cutoff values (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).  Participants were prescreened via questionnaire to 
ensure that no developmental delays, disabilities, or psychiatric disorders were present, 
including ASD.  Minimum sample size per group was calculated by choosing the mid-
level effect size (0.6) from the previously cited research (Cygan, Tacikowski, 
Ostaszewski, Chojnicka, & Nowicka, 2014), power of 0.95, and type I error rate of 
0.05.  Using g*power software, the minimum sample size per group was indicated to be 
12 individuals (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
 
Procedure 
To discover individuals with no clinical diagnosis who varied socially, an 
anonymous online survey was created containing the AQ, BAPQ, demographic, and 
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health-related questions.  The survey was distributed online to introductory psychology 
students in exchange for course credit, e-mailed as a link to the Norman campus student 
body, and advertised online to recruit non-students as well.  All survey participants 
provided written informed consent prior to beginning the survey.  Participants were 
given the option to provide an email address to be contacted at a later date for further 
inclusion in the EEG study.  If inclusion criteria were met and no history of mental 
illness was reported, an individual was sent a personal e-mail inviting them back to 
complete the EEG portion of the experiment.  Interested individuals were given further 
detail and asked to provide a face-forward unobstructed photograph of both the self and 
someone with whom they feel a close emotional bond, along with first and last name of 
each. 
Qualifying participants were brought to a light, sound and electrically-shielded 
room to complete the EEG portion of the experiment.  Participants provided a close-up, 
face-forward photograph of a close friend or family member and the self in advance, 
along with names for the same two categories; these were recorded or uploaded on-site 
into the program and removed once the participant completed his or her EEG session. 
During the EEG portion of the experiment, participants were outfitted with a 
128-channel acquisition net (Electrical Geodesics, Inc.) with sensors placed according 
to an approximated 10-20 system while sitting in front of a computer screen.  EEG was 
sampled at 500 Hz, amplified 10,000x, digitized, bandpass filtered from .1-100 Hz and 
referenced to Cz. The experiment was compiled using Presentation® software to 
present the stimuli and measure responses (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, 
USA).  For the visual portion, participants viewed photos of the self, a close other, and a 
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stranger in random order presented on a computer screen for 500 ms, with an 
interstimulus interval varying randomly between 1000 ms and 1500 ms.  For the audio 
portion, participants listened to an audio recording of the names of the self, close other, 
and stranger, presented via headphones for approximately 2000 ms, depending on 
length of the name, with an interstimulus interval varying randomly between 1000 ms 
and 1500 ms.  In response to each stimulus, the participant was simply asked to press a 
button using the index finger of the right hand as fast as he or she was capable once the 
image or sound appeared.  Responses were considered correct if the button was pressed 
between 150-1000 ms after stimulus onset.  
 
Stimuli/Apparatus 
Faces were presented visually on a computer screen, and names presented via 
Etymotic insert earphones in two separate runs.  Run order was randomly 
counterbalanced, with half beginning with the auditory portion and the other half 
beginning with the visual portion.   
During the face detection run, participants viewed color images of faces from 
three categories against a black background: self, close other, or stranger.  Each face 
image consisted of a cutout circle so that only face, ears, and hair were visible 
surrounded by a white background, creating a rectangle measuring approximately 2.5” x 
3.5” (retaining dimensions) that appeared on a black background.  Luminance and size 
matched stimuli for strangers were provided by an online database (Bainbridge, Isola, & 
Oliva, 2013).  Stranger faces were selected using stratified sampling of the ethnic 
composition of the University of Oklahoma Norman campus.  Each image provided by 
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participants was luminance-matched and size-adjusted to match the stranger faces using 
Adobe Photoshop software.  Visual stimuli were displayed locked to screen refresh rate 
on a 60 Hz LCD color monitor. Once detected, the participant was asked to press the 
space bar on a standard keyboard.  Faces from each category were presented in random 
order at 100 cm viewing distance for a total of 72 stranger trials, 24 close-other trials, 
and 24 self trials. 
The auditory stimuli were recorded and tone-matched using Audacity software 
and onset matched via Matlab v. r2015a (The Mathworks, Natick MA) to prevent 
individual differences.  Names were read using NaturalReader 14.0 software 
(NaturalSoft Ltd., Vancouver BC Canada) using the voice ‘Lauren’ at the speed 0.  The 
participants heard names read through headphones at ~70 db and were asked to respond 
by pressing the space bar once the name was heard.  Participants were asked to remain 
face-forward and looking at a fixation cross on the screen for the duration of the audio 
run.  Names from each category were presented in random order for a total of 72 
stranger trials, 24 close-other trials, and 24 self trials.  Including setup, assessment, 




Correct response times (RTs) were analyzed using an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) using the following factors: group and condition.  Potential covariates (i.e. 
age and gender) were documented and explored in this analysis. 
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EEG sessions were conducted in an EMF/RF shielded, sound-attenuated and 
light-attenuated chamber.  For EEG data, a high-density 128-channel EEG system 
(EGI) was used to collect data at the five components of interest: P100, P200, N100, 
N170, and P300. The highest amplitude of ERP within each above-mentioned time 
range and characteristic topography was visually selected for comparison.  For visual 
P100, the expected time range is 90ms – 100 ms after stimulus onset.  For visual N1, the 
expected time range is 90 ms – 100 ms after stimulus onset.  For auditory N1, the 
expected time range is 80 ms – 120 ms after the onset of the stimulus.  For visual N170 
and auditory N2, the peak amplitude is expected to occur between 130 ms – 200 ms and 
225 ms to 250 ms, respectively.  The peak amplitude for P2 is expected to occur 
between 175 ms and 250 ms, and for P3 the peak amplitude is expected between 250 ms 
and 500 ms post-stimulus onset. 
Raw EEG data were visually inspected to identify bad channels, which were 
then interpolated using spherical spline interpolation (BESA 6.1, MEGIS Software, 
Grafelfing, Germany).  No more than 5% of channels were interpolated for any 
participant. Biological artifacts, such as heart rate and eye movements, were removed 
using Independent Components Analysis (EEGLAB 13.5.4b).    Digital bandpass filters 
were applied from 0.5 – 55 Hz (6 db and 12 db per octave rolloff, respectively) with a 
zero-phase filter.  Data were then epoched from 500 ms before stimulus onset to 750 ms 
after stimulus onset for each condition. At least 90% of trials were accepted for all 
included participants.  
In order to adequately examine spatial topography of ERPs over time, principal 
components analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation was conducted on grand average 
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data for each group with temporally concatenated conditions using BESA 6.1 (MEGIS 
Software, Grafelfing, Germany). Concatenating conditions creates a single PCA 
solution across conditions to which allows for direct comparison of spatial components 
between conditions while still allowing for contribution of unique variance from each 
condition to the PCA solution. For each task, number of components retained was 
determined by the elbow method for the scree plot. Condition averages within-task for 
each individual were then weighted by the component weights and averaged over 
sensors, producing a single “virtual sensor” for each participant, component, and 
condition, spatially weighted toward sensors most strongly representative of that 
particular spatial component topography. This method allows the data to be reduced 
from 128 sensors to one, greatly reducing the need for multiple comparisons.  
Repeated measures mixed-model ANOVA was performed on latencies and amplitudes 
for each component and each task using the following factors: group (between-subject, 
2 levels), peak (within-subject, 2 levels for auditory, 3 levels for visual), and condition 
(within-subject, at the levels of self, close-other, or stranger). Since the P300 was not 
observed in the stranger condition, a separate group by condition repeated measures 




Chapter 3: Results 
Behavioral 
Behavioral data were analyzed for correct responses of each subject; responses 
were considered correct if the space bar was pressed within 150-1000 ms after onset of 
the stimulus.  Response times were analyzed using an ANOVA with the factors group 
and condition.  No significant behavioral differences in reaction time were recorded for 
faces or names by group or condition. 
 
Electrophysiological Data 
PCA results revealed two retained components for each task. For faces the 
components were an occipito-parietal component accounting for 67.9 % of the variance 
and a centro-parietal component accounting for 22.8 % of the variance (see Figures 1 
and 2 for component topographies). For names the components were a parietal 
component accounting for 60.4 % of the variance and a fronto-central component 
accounting for 27.8 % of the variance. 
 
Faces 
Mauchly’s test revealed that for peak, the data violated the assumption of 
sphericity (Χ2(2) = 8.01, p = .018), so the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates are reported for 
all significant results concerning peak (ε = .727). Repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
an expected main effect of peak on amplitude at component 1 F (1.454, 26.169) = 
40.122, p = .000, partial eta squared = .690.  Further, a marginally significant 
interaction between peak and social engagement on amplitude was observed F (2, 
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26.169 = 2.814, p = .092, partial eta squared = .135.  Individuals high in social 
engagement (M = -2.344) showed stronger mean amplitudes for N1 than individuals 
low in social engagement (M = -1.541).  However, an independent samples t-test 
revealed that these differences were not significant by condition at the .05 level.  For 
N170, individuals low in social engagement (M = -4.532) had stronger mean amplitudes 
than those high in social engagement (M = -2.317).  However, t-tests revealed that these 
differences were not significant by condition at the .05 level.  Finally, for P2, 
individuals low in social engagement (M = 2.182) exhibited no significant difference in 
mean amplitudes than those high in social engagement (M = 1.999).  For P300 
amplitude at component 1, a significant main effect of condition was observed F (1, 18) 
= 9.299, p = .007, partial eta squared = .341.  For individuals both high and low in 
social engagement, stronger amplitudes were recorded in response to the close other 
than to the self.  No effect of social engagement on P300 amplitude was observed for 
component 1.   
Mauchly’s test of sphericity revealed a violation of the assumption for both peak 
(Χ2(2) = 10.953, p = .004),  and condition (Χ2(2) = 11.223, p = .004), so the 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates were retained (ε = .678, .674; respectively).  Further 
analysis revealed the expected significant effect of peak for component 2 amplitude F 
(1.356, 24.408) = 16.596, p = .000, partial eta squared = .480.  Expected differences in 
amplitude were observed at each of the three components N1, N170, and P2.  No 
significant differences in P3 amplitude were observed for component 2.   
For the test of effects on latency, Mauchly’s test revealed a violation of the 
assumption of sphericity for condition (Χ2(2) = 15.343, p = .000), ε  = .627) and 
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condition x peak (Χ2(2) = 25.861, p = .002), ε  = .557), so Greenhouse-Geisser estimates 
are reported.  A significant main effect of condition on latency was observed F (1.254, 
22.578) = 73.255, p = .000, partial eta squared = .803.  Importantly, a significant 
interaction between condition and social engagement on latency was observed F (2, 36) 
= 6.515, p = .004, partial eta squared = .266.  For individuals low in social engagement, 
the longest overall latency across peaks was observed while viewing photos of a close 
other (M = 209), followed by photos of the self (M = 177.4), and strangers (M = 100.4).  
For individuals high in social engagement, the longest latency was observed while 
viewing photos of the self (M = 237), followed by the close other (M = 203.2) and 
strangers (M = 96.133).  No significant main effect or interaction of condition or social 
engagement occurred for P300 latency. 
 
Names 
For component 1, the expected main effect of peak on amplitude was observed for N2 
and P2 F (1, 14) = 20.471, p = .000.  Additionally, no effect of social engagement or 
condition was observed for P300 amplitude at component 1.   
 For component 2, the expected main effect of peak on amplitude was observed F 
(1, 15) = 21.474, p = .000, partial eta squared = .589 for N2 and P2.  Further, a 
significant main effect of condition on amplitude was observed F (2, 28.991) = 4.219, p 
= .026, partial eta squared = .220.  The pairwise comparison between the stranger (M = 
.571) and self (M = -.689) condition was significant, p = .007.  No other comparisons 
based on condition were significant, although the pairwise comparison between other 
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and self approached significance.  There were no significant differences in P3 amplitude 
for component 2 based on social engagement or condition. 
 Latency effects were observed for N2 and P2.  The expected main effect of peak 
on latency was observed F (1, 15) = 36.683, p = .000, partial eta squared = .710.  For 
the test of effects of condition on latency, Mauchly’s test revealed the sphericity 
assumption had been violated(Χ2(2) = 13.382, p = .001), ε  = .698), so the Greenhouse-
Geisser estimate was retained.  A significant main effect of condition on latency was 
recorded F (1.238, 18.570) = 34.710, p = .000, partial eta squared = .698.  Additionally, 
a significant interaction between peak and condition on latency was observed F (2, 30) 
= 32.754, p = .000, partial eta squared = .686.  For N2, longer latency was observed 
when hearing one’s own name (M = 265.667) than when hearing the name of a close 
other (M = 192.139) or stranger (M = 193.833).  For P2, the longest latency occurred in 
response to the self (M = 263.819), followed by the close other (M = 262.389) and 
stranger (M = 193.708). 
 A significant main effect on P300 latency of condition was noted F (1, 15) = 
4.911, p = .043, partial eta squared = .247.  Shorter latency was observed in response to 
one’s own name (M = 387.319) than to the name of a close other (M = 411.431).  
Finally, a marginally significant interaction of social engagement and condition on 
latency for auditory P300 was observed F (1, 15) = 4.047, p = .063, partial eta squared 
= .212.  For individuals low in social engagement, the mean latencies for hearing the 
name of a close other (M = 421.111) and self (M = 418.669) were much more similar 
than for those high in social engagement; for those individuals, the mean latency in 
response to the self (M = 355.750) was much lower than when responding to the close 
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other (M = 401.750).   While the difference in P300 latency for those low in social 
engagement was not significant, P300 latency for high SE was significantly shorter in 







Chapter 4: Discussion 
The goal in the current study was to investigate neural activity related to 
perception of faces and names in individuals who vary in social engagement.  The 
names and faces used differed by the level of emotional significance to each individual.  
We were interested in determining whether the self-preference effect would be reduced 
or absent in those with no clinical psychological diagnosis but who nonetheless showed 
lower social activity and skill.  Further, we attempted to extend previous research by 
exploring whether the observed visual effects would be replicated and extended to 
auditory stimuli.   
For visual N100, marginally higher amplitudes were noted for individuals high 
in social engagement than for those low in social engagement.  Luo and colleagues 
(2010) demonstrated that visual N100 is modulated by attentional resources; this 
implies that individuals high in social engagement may be recruiting more attentional 
resources when viewing faces.   
In previous research, N170 was found not to be sensitive to the identity of the 
face, but rather to physical features allowing the brain to discern face vs. non-face 
stimuli (Ghuman et al., 2014).  In this study, we too found no significant differences 
based on the identity of the face being viewed.  However, N170 amplitude was 
marginally stronger for individuals low in social engagement than it was for people high 
in social engagement. Previous research demonstrated enhanced N170 for individuals 
high in social anxiety (Mühlberger et al., 2009).  Perhaps this sheds light on the current 
finding – individuals lower in social engagement may be experiencing enhanced N170 
due to differences in social desire and comfort.  
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P200 is thought to reflect an attention-modulated aspect of higher-order 
perceptual processing.  For stimuli that are highly categorizable, P200 typically occurs 
earlier than for other stimuli types (Pernet et al., 2003).  This earlier latency is believed 
to reflect ability to access memory and storage. In this study, visual P2 amplitude was 
not significantly stronger for individuals low in social engagement than it was for 
individuals high in social engagement.  Since all presented stimuli could be easily 
categorized as belonging to their respective categories, this lack of differences makes 
sense.  Neither group showed any deficit in ability to access memory and storage.  
The significant interaction on visual N100, N170, and P2 latency between 
condition and social engagement is worth further exploration.  For individuals low in 
social engagement, longest latency was observed in response to the close other, 
followed by the self and stranger, respectively.  For those high in social engagement, 
however, the longest latency was reported in response to the self, followed by the close 
other and stranger, respectively.  For both social engagement types, the shortest latency 
was observed for strangers.  However, during processing of individuals with emotional 
relevance we see an interesting difference between the two groups.  The increased 
latency suggests preferential attention allocation to the stimulus in that category; for 
those high in social engagement, this was the self, while for those low in social 
engagement, this was the close other.  
Perhaps this latency difference relates to the degree to which self-representation 
is shared with representations of others.  Individuals low in social engagement failed to 
show the same self-preference effect as those high in social engagement; this suggests 
that individuals low in social engagement may show more shared representations 
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between self and others, an effect that has been noted in individuals with ASD (Cygan 
et al., 2014). Prior research indicated that non-clinical individuals do, in fact, share 
some aspects of their representations of the self with those of close others (Aron et al., 
2004); perhaps individuals low in social engagement distinguish less between self and 
other than do those higher in social engagement.  It could be the case that people who 
are lower in social engagement actually carry more representations from close others 
into representations of the self, thereby creating this lack of a clear preference for self-
referential information.   
There was no main effect of social engagement on these early stimulus 
processing peak latencies, suggesting that unlike in ASD (Marco et al., 2011), basic 
stimulus processing ability is intact in individuals low in social engagement, and does 
not contribute to observed latency differences specific to condition for these groups. 
Previous research concerning neural correlates of hearing one’s own name is 
scarce; interestingly, in the study most similar to the current study’s auditory task, no 
latency effects were observed for P200 or P300 (Höller et al., 2011).  Most of the 
available literature on name recognition focuses on viewing the own name rather than 
listening to the own name (e.g. Zhan, 2016).  One study found that P300 components 
for auditory stimuli were more robust than those for visual stimuli (Bennington & 
Polich, 1999).  Marginally longer P300 latency for those low in social engagement 
could be reflecting a prolonged process in working memory.  This could reflect a 
difference based on real-life behavior: those high in social engagement may display 
shorter latency as an effect of a system that has had more practice (due to regular 
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exposure to self-referential stimuli, for example) than that of individuals who are low in 
social engagement. 
P300 is known to reflect context updating during a task, sustained attention, and 
is known to be influenced by familiarity (Polich, 2007).  In fact, it is this component in 
which the self-preference effect has been illustrated in past research.  In prior research, 
auditory P300 was demonstrated in response to one’s own name, but not to others’ 
names (Folmer & Yingling, 1997). However, in this experiment, researchers were 
trying to demonstrate whether P300 would occur in response to one’s own name versus 
an unkown name and used first names only. In another prior study, researchers 
demonstrated prolonged P300 latency in response to self-relevant words and phrases 
(Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004).  For our name task, P300 latency did not 
differ when hearing names of close others and their own name for individuals low in 
social engagement, whereas individuals high in social engagement showed a self-
preference effect in P300 latency; high SE individuals showed a much faster P300 
response to hearing their own name than to the names of close others.  
Our findings may point to difficulty processing self-relevant stimuli above the 
emotional relevance of familiarity for individuals low in social engagement, reflecting a 
similarity to individuals with ASD in the lack of differentiation neurally between self-
relevant and emotion-relevant stimuli.   Similarity in self-processing in individuals with 
any clinical diagnosis of ASD but who nonetheless show low social preferences may 
point to a neural connection between social processing and self-processing in general 
which may not be unique to ASD. Since this study was conducted in adults with already 
established social preferences and history, it is unclear whether these differences in self-
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preference are innate or are the result of reduced exposure to social stimuli. Neural 
connections strengthen through continued practice or repeated exposure, so perhaps for 
individuals low in social engagement, the brain’s systemic connections to self-relevant 
stimuli are less strong than those for individuals high in social engagement. Further 
study in young children both with and without ASD may help determine the extent to 
which this abnormality results from or precedes the establishment of style of social 
engagement.  
 The current study produced results both similar to and divergent from results of 
a previous study in which names were presented visually (Tacikowski, Cygan, & 
Nowicka, 2014).  Names in this study came from four categories: own name, close 
other, famous person, and stranger.  Participants viewed first and last names presented 
visually on a computer monitor and discriminated between familiar and unfamiliar 
names by pressing one of two buttons.  In their study, larger P200 amplitudes were 
recorded in response to both own name and the name of close others.  In our study, no 
differences in P200 amplitude were observed.  However, we did see a difference in P2 
latency for names.  When hearing the name of the self or close other, individuals 
displayed longer latency than when hearing the name of a stranger. For N250, 
Tacikowski and colleagues (2014) noted larger N250 amplitudes to one’s own name 
than to the unknown name.  In the current study, we add to previous results in that we 
found longer N2 latency to own name.  For P300, they found no amplitude differences 
between own name and close other, but did find a significant difference in amplitude 
between self and famous person or stranger and close other and famous person or 
stranger.  In our study, P300 latency was shorter in response to own name; this result 
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converges with that of Tacikowski’s study – P300 latency did not differ significantly 
between self and close other in their study, but there were significant differences in 
latency noted between the self or close-other and strangers or famous names.   
This study had a few limitations that should be discussed.  First, the sample size was 
small.  Additionally, these individuals were all recruited through web-related methods 
or required to participate for course credit.  This sample may not be generalizable to all 
individuals, being that there are individuals without use of technological resources who 
may show different or more extreme social preferences.  Although additional research 
on the topic is necessary, the current research suggests that non-clinical individuals who 
live and function differently in the social world may in fact show different neural 
activation in response to names and faces that differ based on familiarity and self-
relevance.  Understanding the full scale of social function for non-clinical individuals 
and how it corresponds to neural activity is vital in building a knowledge base 
concerning the abnormal aspects of neural and social functioning, such as those 
reported in individuals with ASD and other neurocognitive disorders.  Increasing 
sample size, including more trials in analyses, and replicating previously found results 
can all play a role in building understanding of the relationship between neural activity 
and the social world. 
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Table 1: Participant Descriptives by Group 
 








High 1 9 10 18 – 53 27.3 0.7 1.6 





Figure 1. Scalp Component Activation and Topography for Faces. 
Middle images represent topography averaged across groups for each component. (A). 
Component 1 waveform for High SE. (B). Component 2 waveform for High SE. (C). 




Figure 2.  Scalp Component Activation and Topography for Names. 
Middle images represent topography averaged across groups for each component. (A). 
Component 1 waveform for High SE. (B). Component 2 waveform for High SE. (C). 
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